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tion except in a few limited cir-
cumstances; thus the seizure of the per-
son, "the taking hold of one's person," 
should logically be limited in the same 
manner. Watson, 44 L. W. 4112, 4117 
(1976). He, however, acceded to the 
COL' t's conclusion on the validity of the 
arrest and also enumerated the practical 
problems in law enforcement if the 
Court of Appeals' decision were allowed 
to stand. Justice Powell concluded that 
the Court's sustaining of the warrantless 
arrest upon probable cause, " ... despite 
the resulting divergence between the 
constitutional rule governing searches 
and that now held applicable to seizures 
of the person ... " was justified. Watson, 
44 L.w. 4112, 4118 (1976). 
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice 
Brennan, filed a dissenting opinion, 
based on the thesis that the Court did not 
decide the case on the narrow question 
presented. Justice Marshall determined 
that the arrest was valid since exiger.t cir-
cumstances were present (the officers 
had knowledge that a felony was being 
committed in their presence and that the 
suspect possessed the incriminating evi-
dence). 
However, Justice Marshall criticized 
the historical precedent which the Court 
relied upon in approving the arrest of 
Watson. He analyzed common law prin-
ciples and concluded that " ... the lesson 
of the common law, and those courts in 
this country that have accepted its rule, is 
an ambiguous one ... ", further, he 
criticized the Court's "unblinking 
literalism" in its analysis. Watson, 44 
L.w. 4112, 4121 (1976). 
Next, citing Marbury v. Madison, 1 
Cranch 137 (1803), as authority, Justice 
Marshall was critical of the deference the 
Court pays to state and federal statutes 
which have codified the common law 
rule. He emphasized that the existence 
of a statute is no defense to an uncon-
stitutional practice. 
He then examined the warrant re-
quirement of the Fourth Amendment. 
Justice Marshall agreed with Justice 
Powell that, logically, arrests and 
searches should be treated similarly in 
regard to this warrant requirement. The 
privacy rights of citizens are certainly bet-
ter protected when a warrant is required 
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for an arrest. Further, the legitimate gov-
ernmental interest in law enforcement is 
not unduly burdened by this require-
ment. In sum, when a warrant can be 
procured, it should be. Justice Marshall 
stated, "I believe the proper result is ap-
plication of the warrant requirement, as 
it has developed in the search context, to 
all arrests." Watson, 44 L. W. 4112, 
4124-4125 (1976). In reference to the 
search issue, Justice Marshall suggested 
that because it was of some complexity 
and had not been thoroughly briefed for 
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1. One spouse's consent to a search of 
the family reSidence, if voluntary and in-
telligent, renders the search valid, even if 
it was made without a warrent, without 
probable cause and without a warning 
from the police that such a search can 
legally be refused. 
Answer: True. Anyone with control over 
the premises can consent to its search; 
knowledge of the legal right to refuse is 
not always required for a valid consent. 
2. Police have rented a hotel room 
next to a room in which they have prob-
able cause to believe a major narcotics 
sale will take place. They may, without a 
warrant, place a device on the wall of 
their room to overhear the talk in the 
next room. 
Answer: False. The police must obtain a 
court order. 
3. Police arrest A, physically torture 
him, and obtain a statement revealing 
the location of evidence implicating B 
and C as well as A in a robbery. The evi-
dence is admissible against Band C. 
Answer: True. The Fourth Amendment 
rights of Band C have not been violated; 
consequently, they lack standing to chal-
lenge the torture of A. 
4. It is not constitutionally required, 
even in a serious felony prosecution, for 
a state to require a twelve-person jury or 
a unanimous verdict of the jurors. 
Answer: True. Neither is necessary for 
the interposition of the "commonsense 
judgment" of a group of laymen be-
tween the accused and his accuser. 
5. The Fifth Amendment privilege 
against sefl-incrimination can be in-
voked by a witness at a Congressional 
inquiry. 
Answer: True. Unless the witness is 
granted immunity, as was John Dean 
when he testified before the Watergate 
Committee. 
6. The Constitution vests the entire 
"power of pardon and reprieves for of-
fenses" against the United States in the 
President. 
Answer: True. Except in cases of im-
peachment. 
7. A state judge's salary is immune 
from federal income tax. 
Answer: False. The income tax has no 
real impact on the state's sovereign func-
tions. 
8. Actions by a state which give pre-
ference to local commerce over com-
merce from out of state are prohibited. 
Answer: True, unless Congress permits 
such preferences in the legislation gov-
erning such commerce. 
9. The burning of draft cards is a pro-
tected form of free speech under the First 
Amendment and thus cannot constitu-
tionally be prosecuted. 
Answer: False. Merely because the per-
son burning the draft card thereby in-
tends to express an idea, his conduct is 
not considered speech protected by the 
First Amendment. 
10. The abstract advocacy of a 
doctrine - even that the government 
should be forcibly overthrown - is con-
stitutionally protected as free speech. 
Answer: True. A "clear and present 
danger of violence" is not presented. 
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11. The distributor of a film found to 
be without serious literary, artistic, politi-
calor scientific value can be convicted 
on criminal charges. 
Answer: True, if the average person ap-
plying contemporary community stan-
dards, would also find that the work, 
taken as a whole, appeals to prurient 
interests, and if the work depicts or de-
scribes sexual conduct in a patently of-
fensive way. 
12. A loyalty oath requirement, which 
a person is required to take in order to 
get a job, would be an invalid infringe-
ment of freedom of belief and associa-
tion, and thus unconstitutional. 
Answer: False. An individual can be 
barred from employment if he has 
knowledge of the improper objective of 
an organization of which he is a member 
and has a specific intent to promote its il-
legal aims. 
13. Sunday closing laws, which would 
economically burden the religious free-
dom of Orthodox Jewish businessmen 
who comply with their religious laws by 
closing on Saturday, are unconstitu-
tional because the First Amendment 
provides that "Congress shall make no 
law ... prohibiting the free exercise (of re-
ligion)." 
Answer: False. Such statutes do not 
make unlawful the religious practices of 
Orthodox Jewish businessmen. Instead, 
they regulate secular commercial activ-
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ity, albeit making the practice of their re-
ligious beliefs more expensive for Or-
thodox Jewish merchants. 
14. A law requiring children to attend 
school until age sixteen is unconstitu-
tional when applied to the Amish, who 
forbid their children from obtaining for-
mal education beyond the eighth grade, 
because of the free exercise of religion 
clause referred to in the previous ques-
tion. 
Answer: True. A compulsory education 
law would gravely endanger, if not de-
stroy, the Amish's free exercise of their 
deep religious convictions, which are in-
timately related to their daily living. 
15. The individual's right to "privacy" 
is expressly granted in the Constitution. 
Answer: False. It is viewed as "emanat-
ing from the totality of the constitutional 
scheme under which we live." 
Success in this quiz is not a failproof 
litmus test of one's knowledge of our 
constitutional system. The Supreme 
Court proVided answers to these ques-
tions only after persuasive arguments 
had been presented on both sides of the 
issues. We must, however, be sensitive 
to the views which framed those argu-
ments to know the true meaning of our 
Bicentennial. 
Thomas Jefferson, the principal 
draftsman of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence, believed that the people, 
themselves, were the safest and most 
virtuous - though not always the 
wisest - depository of power. Educa-
tion, he felt, would perfect their wisdom. 
Where education fell short, the Bill of 
Rights would provide the judiciary with 
the power to preserve the rights of the 
minority, and, ultimately, the society at 
large. But a judiciary standing alone in 
defense of individual liberties, Jefferson 
warned us, would provide an in-
adequate protection against tyranny. 
The American people must also be 
aware why it is necessary to protect the 
zealot's right to speak, or the freedom 
from unreasonable search of an ac-
cused. Public apathy and ignorance 
about the workings of our government 
and our basic constitutional freedoms 
makes us vulnerable, as recent 
experience has revealed, to officials who 
ignore the constitutional limits on their 
power. 
All of which is not to say that we 
should forbear celebrating the Fourth of 
July next summer until we can handle 
the above questions with the aplomb of 
an Archibald Cox. The events of recent 
years have served to emphasize our 
need for an occasion designed to re-
juvenate our faith in our institutions and 
our country. What will make that cele-
bration more meaningful and more in 
keeping with the first celebration of the 
Declaration of Independence will be an 
increased understanding and apprecia-
tion of those ideals which our forefathers 
implemented two hundred years ago. 
